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I. Introduction
Governments commonly assert that there exists a right to derogate
from human rights norms to safeguard the public interest during crises.
Such assertions reflect an attempt to reconcile individual and aggregate
interests.' This task becomes especially difficult in situations of public
emergency.2 Crisis or emergency situations usually involve violence
and the imminent or actual breakdown of minimum order. In such
situations, insistence on special individual interests can have serious
detrimental effects on community welfare. The need to accommodate
both sets of claims is recognized in international documents dealing
with the protection of human rights as well as in national instruments
safeguarding basic rights and fundamental freedoms.3 While it is clear
that individual rights are not absolute, the international community
must guard against spurious invocations of community interests to ex-
cuse violations of human rights. Such invocations are typically made
to facilitate the task of power elites in ruling a community or, worse, to
further their special interests.4
International documents for the protection of human rights use sev-
eral techniques to reconcile individual rights with community inter-
ests.5 One such technique is an "accommodation clause" which
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3. See the respective provisions in the constitutions of the following countries: Finland,
art. 16 (1919); France, art. 36 (1958); Greece, art. 48 (1975); the Netherlands, art. 202 (1972);
Portugal, art. 19 (1976); Turkey, art. 124 (1961); Spain, art. 55 (1978). See also O'Boyle,
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4. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 1, at 803-05.
5. See Higgins, Derogations under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L LAW 281
(1976-77); Stein, Derogation from Guarantees Laid Down in Human Rights Instruments, in
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provides that the right in question shall be subject to limits dictated by
such considerations as public order, national security, and general wel-
fare.6 Paragraph 2 of article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights dealing with the right to respect for private and family life, the
home, and correspondence is a good example:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.7
Another commonly used technique is a "derogation clause" allowing
partial or complete suspension of certain rights in situations of public
emergency. 8 Examples of this kind of provision are article 15 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, article 4 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights9 and article 27 of the American
6. For a survey, see M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 1, at 806-13;
see also Higgins, supra note 5, at 283-86, 307-15.
7. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 84, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted in EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
COLLECTED TEXTS 101 (Council of Europe 1981) [hereinafter European Convention].
8. See Schwelb, Some Aspects of the International Conventions on Human Rights of De-
cember 1966, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 103, 115-17 (A. Eide &
A. Schou eds. 1968); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 1, at 813-15; van
Hoof, The Protection of Human Rights and the Impact of Emergency Situations Under Inter-
national Law with Special Reference to the Present Situation in Chile, 10 HUMAN RIGHTS J.
213, 233-38; Green, Derogation of Human Rights in Emergency Situations, 16 CAN. Y. B.
INT'L LAW 92 (1978); Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissi-
ble Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 80 (L. Henkin ed. 1981); Ques-
tiaux, Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning
Situations Known as State ofSiege or Emergency, Progress report to the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the U.N. COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub.2/490 (1981).
9. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4 states that:
1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence
of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social
origin.
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be
made under this provision.
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation
shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the
intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from
which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further commu-
nication shall be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it termi-
nates such derogation.
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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Convention on Human Rights.' 0 Article 15 of the European Conven-
tion provides:
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation, any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from
its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsis-
tent with its other obligations under international law.
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting
from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be
made under this provision.
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation
shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed
of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall also
inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such meas-
ures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are be-
ing fully executed.' 1
The underlying policy is to provide for limited noncompliance in or-
der to obviate the need for more far-reaching limitations of human
rights. In the absence of such a legal safety valve, states might hesitate
to join the Convention or might attach more significant reservations to
their accession. Moreover, in situations of actual emergency, such as
war, civil strife, or revolution, national elites may regard compliance as
a low priority and may resort to broader claims to derogation like "ne-
cessity" or may even denounce the Convention altogether. While a
reservation to accession permits partial, uncontrolled, and permanent
limitations and a denunciation allows a complete and uncontrolled ter-
10. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 27, "Suspension of Guarantees," states
that:
I. In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence
or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations under
the present Convention to the extent and for the period of time strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its
other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination on the
ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.
2. The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the following arti-
cles: Article 3 (Right to juridical personality), Article 4 (Right to life), Article 5 (Free-
dom from torture), Article 6 (Freedom from slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from post
facto laws), Article 12 (Freedom of conscience and religion), Article 17 (Rights of the
family), Article 13 (Right to a name), Article 19 (Rights of the child), Article 20 (Right
to nationality), and Article 23 (Right to participate in government), or of the judicial
guarantees essential for the protection of such rights.
3. Any State Party availing itself of the rights of suspension shall immediately in-
form the other States Parties, through the Secretary-General of the Organization of
American States, of the provisions the application of which it has suspended, the rea-
sons that gave rise to the suspension, and the date set for the termination of such
suspension.
O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1 (1970).
11. For a short history of the provision, see Higgins, supra note 5, at 289.
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
mination, a derogation clause, such as article 15 of the European Con-
vention, allows only for partial, controlled, and temporary limitations.
Derogation clauses, therefore, offer undeniable advantages. Never-
theless, they should be formulated and applied in accordance with im-
portant basic policies:
1. Foremost and most fundamental is the principle of reasonable
accommodation between the necessities of community interests and
justified particular individual interests.
2. Derogations must be accompanied by official proclamations and
notifications giving all relevant details.
3. Derogations must be subject to effective outside supervision in
order to prevent abuse.
4. Derogations must be used only in situations of absolute necessity
in which other means cannot reasonably be expected to safeguard pub-
lic order.
5. Derogations must be applied subject to strict proportionality.
This means: (1) that the derogation should only apply to those rights
which have to be limited to cope with the emergency; and (b) that the
limitation should only apply to the extent absolutely required.
6. Derogations should be withdrawn as soon as circumstances
permit.
II. Past Practice of Derogation
This section concentrates on the European Convention on Human
Rights, though comparative aspects are also included. 12 Past practice
with respect to derogation consists of the declarations of derogation
made by Member States under article 15, paragraph 3 of the Conven-
tion and of the cases which have been brought to the international or-
gans supervising the application of the Convention.
The European Convention is subject to a strict, impartial and
nonpoliticized international supervision by its Commission (Commis-
sion) and the European Court of Human Rights (Court). Proceedings
before these organs have included three major cases dealing with the
12. See also J. FAWCETr, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 245-250 (1969); A. DEL. Russo, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 123-28, 155-59 (1971); Partsch, Experiences Regarding the War and Emergency
Clause afthe European Convention on Human Rights, I ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 327
(1971); F. CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 165-70 (1974); F.
JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 204-09 (1975); Higgins, supra
note 5, at 289-307; O'Boyle, supra note 3, at 178-84.
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question of derogation: The Lawless Case13 against the Republic of
Ireland, which originated from an individual complaint and was ex-
amined by the Commission and by the Court; the case against
Greece,' 4 which originated from a complaint by several other Member
States and did not reach the Court; and the case of Ireland v. United
Kingdom' 5 which was examined by the Commission and the Court.
The relevant provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and of the American Convention on Human Rights are
strikingly similar to article 15 of the European Convention, though
there are some differences. European practice should therefore also of-
fer important authority on the application of these provisions.
A. Not fcation
Paragraph 3 of article 15 of the European Convention requires notifi-
cation to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of all meas-
ures taken under the derogation clause and of the reasons therefore.
Four parties to the Convention have availed themselves of this possibil-
ity: the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, and Turkey.
By 1966 the United Kingdom had given a number of notices of dero-
gation with respect to certain of its overseas territories.' 6 These deroga-
tions almost exclusively concerned measures of administrative
detention. The territories have since become independent, and the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights no longer applies to them. The
second group of derogations by the United Kingdom concerns North-
ern Ireland. These derogations also provide for measures of adminis-
trative arrest and detention. Notice was first given in 1957 and has
13. Report of the European Commission on Human Rights, Lawless Case (Lawless v.
Ireland), 1960-1961 E.C.H.R., ser. B, at 9 [hereinafter Commission Report in Lawless Case];
Lawless Case (Lawless v. Ireland), 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438 (Eur.
Court of Human Rights).
14. The Greek Case, 1969 [THE GREEK CASE] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1
(Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
15. Report of the European Commission on Human Rights (Ireland v. U.K.), 1976-78
E.C.H.R., ser. B, vol. 23-I, at 8 [hereinafter Commission Report in Ireland Case]; Ireland v.
U.K., [1978] 2 E.H.R.R. 25 (Eur. Court of Human Rights).
16. These territories included Malaya, Singapore, Kenya, British Guiana, Uganda, Cy-
prus, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasalund, Aden, Zanzibar, and Mauritias. See 1955-1957 Y.B
EUR. CoNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 48-51 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights; 1958-1959 Y.B.
EUR. CoNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 78-86 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1960 Y.B. EUR.
CoNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 68-90 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1961 Y.B. EUR. CoNv.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 38-54 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1962 Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 8-10 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1963 Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 32 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1964 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
28-30 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1965 Y.B. EUR. CONv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 10-16
(Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1966 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 16-20 (Eur.
Comm'n on Human Rights).
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since been renewed and amended several times.'7 The United King-
dom, though it has made relatively frequent use of article 15, has never
applied the derogation clause to England, Scotland, and Wales.
The Republic of Ireland has given notices of derogation for the peri-
ods 1957-1962 and 1976-1977.1 8 Both notices concerned measures of
administrative detention that were subject to certain safeguards and
that were later withdrawn. The United Kingdom and Ireland always
gave detailed information concerning the precise nature of the meas-
ures to be taken and the reasons for the derogations.
By contrast, in 1967, Greece gave notice of the suspension of an ex-
tensive list of articles of its constitution.19 Subsequent communications
supplied information concerning the alleged necessity of this step and
details concerning relaxations of the derogation. 20 The Commission
found these notices incomplete. 21
Turkey has given the most far-reaching notices of derogation. They
span the years 1961, 1963-1964, 1970-1975, and the years since 1978.22
The reasons given for the steps are not compelling and, more impor-
tant, the extent of the derogations is unspecified. The notices simply
refer to states of emergency, siege, or martial law. It is obvious that
these notices do not satisfy the requirement to provide full information
concerning the measures taken. Unfortunately, the compatibility of the
17. 1955-1957 Y.B. EUR. CoNV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 50 (Eur. Comm'n on Human
Rights); 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 72-74 (Eur. Comm'n on Human
Rights); 1971 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights);
1973 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 24-28 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1975
Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1978 Y.B. EUR.
CoNr. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 22 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
18. 1955-1957 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 47-48 (Eur. Comm'n on Human
Rights); 1962 Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights);
1976 Y.B. EtLR.,CONv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 20-24 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1977
Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 20 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
19. 1967 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 26-36 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
20. Id. at 38-44; 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 38-72 (Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights).
21. The Greek Case, 1969 [THE GREEK CASE] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 41-
43 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
22. 1961 Y.B.. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 54-62 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights);
1964 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 22-26 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1970
Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 18-22 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1971 Y.B.
EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 24-32 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1972 Y.B. EUR.
CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 16-22 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1973 Y.B. EUR. CONY.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 16-24 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1974 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 24-28 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1975 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 8-16 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 20 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); 1979 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
26-30 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
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Turkish derogations with the Convention has, so far, not been ex-
amined by the Commission or the Court.
Surprisingly, article 15 of the European Convention does not contain
time limits for notification of derogations. By contrast, article 4(3) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights2 3 and article
27(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights24 require immedi-
ate transmission of such information. Presumably, these provisions
will be interpreted to require that such information must be forthcom-
ing not later than the time of the imposition of the measures of
derogation.
Examination of the notices of derogation submitted by Member
States reveals that there have been considerable delays in notification,
especially in the earlier years of the Convention. In particular, the no-
tices of derogation provided by the United Kingdom with respect to its
overseas territories were often submitted only months or even years af-
ter the imposition of administrative detention. Recently, compliance
has improved greatly and notifications are provided within days of the
imposition of measures derogating from the Convention. In the cases
brought before the Commission and the Human Rights Court, it was
found that there was no obligation to inform the Secretary-General
prior to the imposition of the measures in question and that notice
within twelve days to three weeks was to be regarded as timely.25
Governments also are required to give a specific and timely state-
ment of the reasons for derogation.26 In the case against Greece, the
Commission found that communication of the reasons for derogation
more than four months after its imposition was unduly late. The Com-
mission also found that information supplied after it had received a
complaint could not replace the communication to the Secretary Gen-
eral required by article 15(3).27
Governments must give information concerning the nature of the
measures taken, but there is no obligation specifically to indicate from
which articles of the Convention derogation is made. The communica-
23. See supra note 9.
24. See supra note 10.
25. Commission Report in Lawless Case, supra note 13, at 73; Lawless Case (Lawless v.
Ireland), 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438, 482-84 (Eur. Court of Human
Rights); The Greek Case, 1969 [THE GREEK CASE] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1,
41-43 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
26. Commission Report in Lawless Case, supra note 13, at 73-74; Lawless Case (Lawless
v. Ireland), 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438, 482 (Eur. Court of Human
Rights).
27. The Greek Case, 1969 [THE GREEK CASE] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1,
41-43 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
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tion of the legislative text providing for the derogation is permissible.2 8
By contrast, both the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights require precise
information identifying which provisions of the respective treaties a
Member purports to derogate.
A violation of the requirement to give notification apparently does
not render the derogation automatically void.29 In the case against
Greece, the Commission proceeded to investigate the merits of the der-
ogation after having found its notification defective. Noncompliance
with the obligation to give notice, however, will probably provide
prima facie evidence of bad faith and thus may affect the decision on
the merits.30
B. Supervision
Application of the derogation clause contained in article 15 is subject
to the same international supervision as is the rest of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Complaints are first referred to the
Commission either by Member States31 or by individuals, provided
that the state against which the complaint is directed has recognized the
right to individual petition.32 If the Commission finds the petition ad-
missible, it attempts to secure a friendly settlement. In the process, it
undertakes a full investigation of the case and ascertains all the rele-
vant facts.33 In the event that a friendly settlement can be achieved, the
case is closed with a brief report.34 Otherwise, the Commission
prepares a full report that includes a statement of whether the facts
disclose a breach of the Convention.35 If the case is not referred to the
Court, then the Committee of Ministers, a political body of the Council
of Europe, decides whether there has been a violation of the Conven-
tion and on any measures to be taken by the Member State.36
The jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights is subject
28. Commission Report in Lawless Case, supra note 13, at 74; Lawless Case (Lawless v.
Ireland), 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438, 484 (Eur. Court of Human
Rights). The Greek Case, 1969 [THE GREEK CASE] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1,
41 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
29. The question was left open by the Commission Report in the Lawless Case, supra
note 13, at 74.
30. See also Higgins, supra note 5, at 290-93.
31. European Convention, supra note 7, art. 24.
32. Id. art. 25.
33. Id. art. 28.
34. Id. art. 30.
35. Id. art. 31.
36. Id. art. 32.
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to optional declarations by Member States.37 In any event, the Court
may only deal with a case after the completion of proceedings before
the Commission.38 A case may be referred to the Court either by the
Commission or by a state involved in the case, but not by individuals.
Proceedings before the Court are completed by a judgment which is
final.
Significantly, all the major cases dealing with the emergency clause
of the Convention, with the exception of the Lawless Case, have been
initiated by state petitions. This is partially due to the absence of a
submission to the right of individual petition by the derogating Mem-
ber such as in the cases of Greece and Turkey. With respect to Turkey,
it took three and a half years from the imposition of martial law on
December 26, 1978, until several Member States filed a complaint with
the Commission in mid-1982.
Judicial supervision of emergency measures is obviously a difficult
task requiring examination of social context and involving a certain
amount of political judgment. The Commission and the Court have
found that the states concerned must themselves assess all relevant fac-
tors, determine whether a state of emergency requiring measures of
derogation existed, and identify which measures were strictly required.
The government is afforded a margin of appreciation, but its determi-
nation is not accepted as conclusive.39 In all cases, the international
supervisory organs ultimately decided whether the state had used its
discretion properly.40 In the words of the Court:
It falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility
for "the life of its nation," to determine whether that life is threatened by
a "public emergency" and, if so, how far is it necessary to go in attempt-
ing to overcome the emergency. By reason of their direct and continuous
contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities
are in principle in a better position than the international judge to decide
both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope
37. Id. art. 46.
38. Id. art. 47.
39. Velu, Le Contr~le des organes pr vus par la Convention europbenne des droits de
ihomme sur le but, le moiff et l'objet des mesures d'exception dbrogeant a cette Convention, in
MELANGES OFFERTS A HENRY ROLIN 462 (1964); Morrisson, Margin of-Appreciation in Eu-
ropean Human Rights Law, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 263 (1973); Higgins, supra note 5, at 296-
301; Stein, supra note 5, at 128-30; Kelly, The European Convention on Human Rights and
States Parties: International Control of Restrictions and Limitations, in PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 163 (I. Maier ed. 1982).
40. Lawless Case (Lawless v. Ireland), 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438,
470-86 (Eur. Court of Human Rights); First Cyprus Case, 1958-1959 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 176 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights); The Greek Case, 1969 [THE GREEK
CASE] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 72-76.
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of derogations necessary to avert it. In this mater Article 15(I) leaves
those authorities a wide margin of appreciation.
Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this re-
spect. The Court, which, with the Commission, is responsible for ensur-
ing the observance of the States' engagements. ., is empowered to rule
on whether the States have gone beyond the "extent strictly required by
the exigencies" of the crisis. . . . The domestic margin of appreciation is
thus accompanied by a European supervision.41
It is clear that not only the question of the existence of an emergency
but also all other aspects of a derogation, including the proportionality
of the measures actually taken, are subject to the supervision of the
international organs.
C. Necessity: the Existence of a Public Emergency
In determining the necessity of a derogation, the first question must
be to inquire what circumstances justify a derogation. In other words,
what constitutes a "public emergency threatening the life of the
nation"?42
The Convention is quite vague concerning the community values af-
fected. One possible interpretation is that the threat to the life of the
nation is to be understood as a threat to the existing power structure.
More specifically, ruling elites who believe that their position or the
constitutional structure on which it rests is endangered are entitled to
derogate from human rights obligations. In this generalized form, such
a claim is hardly acceptable. It would mean that nonviolent opposition
or even an election victory by the opposition party might justify dero-
gation. A solution to this dilemma might be to accept such a claim
only in favor of democratic political systems, but to deny it to totalitar-
ian regimes. This reading of "emergency theatening the life of the na-
tion" might be acceptable in the framework of the Council of Europe
with its relatively homogeneous political values and power structures,
but it is probably unworkable on a global level. Ideas about democ-
racy and about a preferred political order are too diverse to provide a
viable consensus on this question.
Another approach to defining "emergency" for the purpose of al-
lowing derogations would be to look at the well-being of the commu-
nity in terms of the physical well-being of the population, especially in
situations of extensive violence. Large scale terrorism or civil war af-
41. Ireland v. U.K., [1978] 2 E.H.R.R. 25, 91-92 (Eur. Court of Human Rights) (footnote
omitted).
42. See also Higgins, supra note 5, at 301-02; Stein, supra note 5, at 130-32.
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fecting large segments of the population might be regarded as justifying
derogations. The phrase "war or other public emergency" adds a con-
notation of violence to the provision and therefore would seem to sup-
port this interpretation. From the perspective of accommodating
community and individual interests, this interpretation is probably the
most convincing one. There is, however, one danger: a government or
other power elite wishing to invoke the derogation clause might be
tempted to provoke an atmosphere of violence in order to support its
claim that an emergency threatening the life of the nation exists.
An investigation into the meaning of "emergency threatening the life
of the nation" might also be undertaken with the help of other values.
The economic condition of a community might be invoked, yet the
consequences of such a justification are unpredictable. An economic
emergency, for example, might be put forward as justification for the
introduction of forced labor. Massive immigration might serve as a
basis for a claim of an emergency threatening the ethnic identity of a
community, justifying mass expulsion or sterilization. The potential
dangers of a broad interpretation of the concept of public emergency
are evident.
With respect to practice under the European Human Rights Conven-
tion, we can identify certain types of claims made by governments to
support derogations. In the Lawless Case,43 the Irish government relied
primarily on the warlike operations of the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) against the authorities in Northern Ireland and an attempt to
involve the Irish state in a war against a foreign state.44 The govern-
ment also pointed to the horrors of civil war in Northern Ireland, that
is, outside the territory of the Republic. With respect to this territorial
aspect, the government emphasized its international law obligation to
prevent the use of its territory as a base for terrorist attacks abroad and
the special responsibility of members of the Council of Europe to each
other.45 The applicant countered these arguments by claiming that he
belonged to a political movement in the Republic of Ireland and that
the military activities in Northern Ireland were carried out mainly by
residents there.46
Both the Commission and the Court accepted the Irish government's
contentions in this case. The Court defined "public emergency threat-
43. Lawless Case (Lawless v. Ireland), 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438
(Eur. Court of Human Rights). For a synopsis of the Lawless Case, see A. ROBERTSON,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 112-39 (1963).
44. Commission Report in Lawless Case, supra note 13, at 76.
45. Id. at 88-89.
46. Id. at 77-78.
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ening the life of the nation" somewhat ambiguously as "an exceptional
situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and
constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of which the
State is composed. '47 There were a number of factors which the Court
found relevant: (1) the existence of a secret army (the IRA) engaged in
unconstitutional activities and using violence to attain its ends; (2) the
fact that this army was also operating outside State territory, jeopardiz-
ing the Republic of Ireland's relations with its neighbor; and (3) the
steady and alarming increase in terrorist activities.48 The Court em-
phasized the threat that these activities posed to the life of the Irish
Republic.49
In the second case concerning Northern Ireland, the inter-State ap-
plication of Ireland v. United Kingdom, the claims made by the respon-
dent government to justify the derogations were similar. They pointed
to extensive shooting, bombing, and rioting. The main reasons given
for the necessity to take emergency measures were the inability of the
ordinary criminal courts to restore peace and order, the widespread in-
timidation of the population, and the difficulties for control presented
by the easy escape across the border.50
In this case, the applicant government did not contest the existence
of an emergency. Still, could it really be said that the disturbances in
Northern Ireland "threatened the life of the nation," i.e., of the United
Kingdom? In The Greek Case, the Commission had required that an
emergency invoked for purposes of article 15 must affect the whole na-
tion.51 The fact that the emergency affected only Northern Ireland
does not seem to have worried either the applicant government or the
Commission and Court.52 This appears to be sound policy. The recog-
nition of a crisis situation affecting a certain region cannot depend on
the question of whether it extends to the entire nation-state, including
all other regions or provinces and, possibly, overseas territories. Such a
requirement would put undue restrictions on states with large territo-
ries inhabited by politically and ethnically diverse populations. It
would also invite a government to extend notices of derogation to its
47. Lawless Case (Lawless v. Ireland), 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438,
472-74 (Eur. Court of Human Rights).
48. Id. at 474.
49. Id.; see also Opinion of Five Members of the Commission, in Commission Report in
Lawless Case, supra note 13, at 83.
50. Commission Report in Ireland Case, supra note 15, at 75-86.
51. The Greek Case, 1969 [THE GREEK CASE] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1,
72 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
52. Commission Report in Ireland Case, supra note 15, at 117; Ireland v. U.K., [1978] 2
E.H.R.R. 25, 91 (Eur. Court of Human Rights).
124
Vol. 9:113, 1982
Derogation of Human Rights
entire territory, beyond where it would be absolutely necessary.5 3
The claims put forward by the government in The Greek Case to
justify the derogation were substantially different from those offered in
the two Irish cases. Invocation of the derogation clause in the two Irish
cases was justified in terms of the well-being of the population in the
face of terrorist violence, while the revolutionary government of
Greece relied primarily on considerations of power. The main argu-
ments were the danger of a Communist takeover and the crisis of con-
stitutional government as evidenced by a rapid succession of
governments, by corruption, by strikes, and by an ailing .economy. A
third argument was that there was a crisis of public order in the form of
violent demonstrations.5 4
Examination of the factual evidence presented in the Commission's
report on the Greek case indicates that the situation became considera-
bly more violent after the military coup and the imposition of the dero-
gations.5 5 The applicant governments in fact pointed out that a
revolutionary government could hardly justify derogation by relying on
an emergency which it had created itself.56 In its report on this case the
Commission attempted to give a general and comprehensive list of re-
quirements for a "public emergency":
(1) It must be actual or imminent.
(2) Its effects must involve the whole nation.
(3) The continuance of the organised life of the community must be
threatened.
(4) The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal meas-
ures or restrictions, permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of
public safety, health and order, are plainly inadequate.57
The Commission added that the burden of proof lay on the govern-
ment to show that the conditions for derogation had been satisfied
throughout the period of the derogation. Greece had failed to do this
in the particular case.58 It is worth noting that the Commission did not
dismiss the government's argument concerning the threat of a Commu-
nist takeover as being outside the scope of a "public emergency threat-
ening the life of the nation." It merely found that there was insufficient
evidence in this respect.59
53. See Buergenthal, supra note 8, at 80.
54. The Greek Case, 1969 [THE GREEK CASE] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1,
45-71 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
55. See id. at 92-100.
56. Id. at 32.
57. Id. at 72.
58. Id. at 72-76.
59. Id. at 76.
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D. Proportionality" The Extent Strictly Required
Determining whether measures derogating from the obligations of
the Convention were taken only to the extent strictly required raises
difficult questions concerning proportionality. A number of questions
should be asked:
1. Is the derogation of the particular guaranteed right the only way
to cope with the emergency or are there less drastic alternatives?
2. How far must the derogation of this right extend?
3. Are there any checks and safeguards against excessive or unnec-
essary use of the derogation?
4. Did the government relax or terminate the derogation as soon as
this was possible?
1. The Rights Affected
The practice with respect to proportionality shows a clear difference
in approach between the Northern Ireland cases and The Greek Case.
Both Irish cases involved measures of administrative detention. In the
case against the United Kingdom, the government had resorted not
only to internment of suspects but also to temporary detention of wit-
nesses. This, it was claimed, was necessary to obtain evidence in the
face of widespread intimidation of the population.60 In both cases the
respective respondent governments emphasized that the ordinary
means provided by the law were insufficient to cope with the situa-
tion.6' In both cases the applicants denied the inadequacy of ordinary
legal means and branded the detention measures excessive. 62
By contrast, The Greek Case involved the suspension of a wide range
of human rights. Evidence showed violations of the right to protection
against arbitrary detention, to a fair trial, to respect for one's home, to
freedom of expression, to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion,
to freedom of assembly and association, to an effective remedy against
human rights violations, and to free elections. 63 In addition, there were
violations of rights which were not even subject to derogation. 64
The practice of the Commission and of the Court on the question of
proportionality shows the application of strict standards. 65 For in-
60. Commission Report in Ireland Case, supra note 15, at 85.
61. Commission Report in Lawless Case, supra note 13, at 104; Commission Report in
Ireland Case, supra note 15, at 79.
62. Commission Report in Lawless Case, supra note 13, at 102-03; Commission Report
in Ireland Case, supra note 15, at 86-92.
63. The Greek Case, 1969 [THE GREEK CASE] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1,
134-36, 147-49, 152-53, 164-65, 170-72, 174, 179-80 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
64. Id. at 498-505.
65. See Higgins, supra note 5, at 302-05; Stein, supra note 5, at 132.
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stance, the existence of a high level of violence was not automatically
accepted as requiring measures like administrative detention.66 Both
bodies examined the measures in the light of possible alternatives that
would not require a derogation. In the Lawless Case,67 and in Ireland
v. United Kingdom,68 the Court came to the conclusion that ordinary
law had been shown insufficient to cope with the crisis. In particular,
the resources of ordinary criminal courts, special criminal courts, and
military courts had proven inadequate.
2. The Extent of Measures
The extent of a derogation must be strictly related '1" the situation.
In other words, there must be a link between the facts of the emergency
and the specific measures chosen.69 Even where derogations are legiti-
mate, the individual measures taken must be applied only to the extent
absolutely necessary to cope with the emergency. Where administra-
tive arrest and detention was justified in principle by the situation, for
example, much stricter standards had to be applied to the arrest of wit-
nesses not suspected of crimes, whose temporary detention was neces-
sary in the face of intimidation, than to the detention of members of
terrorist organizations in order to prevent further violence. In Ireland
v. United Kingdom, it was found that, in light of the situation taken as a
whole, the United Kingdom had complied with this flexible standard.70
By contrast, in the case against Greece the Commission found that,
even on the assumption that an emergency existed, the sweeping and
unspecified derogations and the measures taken went beyond what was
strictly required.71
3. Alternative Safeguards
The fact that an emergency calls for exceptional measures, usually by
the executive, does not mean that such executive action should proceed
without checks and supervision. The dangers of unnecessary and ex-
cessive use of emergency powers call for particularly stringent safe-
guards against abuse. In some instances, the urgency of the situation
may permit only a subsequent examination of the propriety and pro-
portionality of particular measures. Still, the realization that supervi-
66. Commission Report in Ireland Case, supra note 15, at 119.
67. Lawless Case (Lawless v. Ireland), 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438,
476 (Eur. Court of Human Rights).
68. Ireland v. U.K., [1978] 2 E.H.R.R. 25, 93-94 (Eur. Court of Human Rights).
69. Commission Report in Ireland Case, supra note 15, at 119.
70. Id. at 120-22; Ireland v. U.K., [1978] 2 E.H.R.R. 25, 93-94 (Eur. Court of Human
Rights).
71. The Greek Case, 1969 [THE GREEK CASE] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1,
135-36, 148-49, 180 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
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sion exists, albeit subsequent to the measures, may have a mitigating
effect on the use of emergency powers and is an important check
against their excessive use. Effective domestic supervision of deroga-
tions of human rights is therefore essential to minimize the danger of
disproportionate application.
In both cases dealing with Northern Ireland, Lawless and Ireland v.
United Kingdom , the Court and the Commission paid great attention to
so-called alternative safeguards. In the Lawless Case, the Court noted
that there was parliamentary supervision, that the detainees could ap-
ply to an independent "Detention Commission," and that persons who
satisfied certain conditions were being released.72 In Ireland v. United
Kingdom, the safeguards provided by an advisory committee of com-
missioners and an appeal tribunal were accepted as adequate. 73
4. Relaxation
Another important aspect of proportionality is a flexible application
of emergency measures. Exceptional measures which may have ap-
peared imperative at a certain stage may become dispensable as the
situation improves or as the authorities obtain a clearer picture of the
details of the emergency. The temptation to maintain exceptional
measures for administrative convenience after they are no longer neces-
sary must be resisted.
Proportionality of measures at any stage of the emergency must be
subject to stringent internal and international supervision. On the
other hand, a relaxation should not serve as evidence that previous
measures were excessive. A government faced with the possibility that
a relaxation of emergency measures might be construed as an implicit
admission that the measures had been disproportionate will be very
reluctant to relax them.
In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the defendant government had relaxed
its measures considerably and improved safeguards after assuming di-
rect control of the province in March, 1972, although the situation had
not improved. The Irish Government claimed that this showed that the
measures in question had been unnecessary and excessive. Both the
Commission 74 and the Court75 rejected this argument. They found that
evolution in the direction of increased respect for individual liberty
72. Lawless Case (Lawless v. Ireland), 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438,
478 (Eur. Court of Human Rights).
73. Commission Report in Ireland Case, supra note 15, at 124-52; Ireland v. U.K., [1978]
2 E.H.R.R. 25, 96 (Eur. Court of Human Rights).
74. Commission Report in Ireland Case, supra note 15, at 124-25.
75. Ireland v. U.K., [19781 2 E.H.R.R. 25, 93-97 (Eur. Court of Human Rights).
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merely showed that the government had exercised its discretion in a
responsible way. In the words of the Commission:
The fact that the measures were improved with time whereas the crisis
became more grave cannot be taken to show that the measures under the
Special Powers Act ever exceeded the requirements of the situation. Ex-
perience must allow improvements to be made by a Government without
its afterwards being held guilty of having violated the Convention.
Otherwise this possibility might even conceivably impede the improve-
ment of the safeguards as experience was gained.76
E. Other Obligations under International Law
Article 15 of the European Convention, like article 4 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 27 of the
American Convention, only permits derogations where such measures
are not inconsistent with other obligations under international law.
The policy behind this savings clause is obviously to deny governments
an excuse for violating other international obligations, especially other
human rights conventions. For the Members who are signatories of the
European Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights might constitute an additional set of obligations. Article 4
of the International Covenant is not identical to article 15 of the Euro-
pean Convention, especially with respect to the list of rights that are
not subject to derogation.77 Article 15 of the European Convention
lists only the right to life,78 the prohibition of torture, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment,79 the prohibition of slavery or servi-
tude,80 and the nonretroactivity of criminal legislation8' as rights not
subject to derogation. By contrast, the list of rights not subject to dero-
gation in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is
considerably longer. In addition to the list of rights in article 15 of the
European Convention, it includes the prohibition of imprisonment for
debt,82 the right to recognition as a person,83 and freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion.84 The list of rights not subject to derogation
in the more recent American Convention on Human Rights85 is even
longer, although, of course, it is not applicable in the European context.
76. Commission Report in Ireland Case, supra note 15, at 125.
77. Stein, supra note 5, at 126-28.
78. European Convention, supra note 7, art. 2.
79. Id. art. 3.
80. Id. art. 4(3).
81. Id. art. 7.
82. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 9, art. 11.
83. Id. art. 16.
84. Id. art. 18.
85. See supra note 10.
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Other obligations of international law with which members of the
European Convention on Human Rights must comply are the provi-
sions of international humanitarian law, notably the four Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949.86 Article 15 of the European Convention is not just a
general savings clause for other international obligations of Member
States, but also makes an infringement of these other international ob-
ligations an additional violation of the European Convention. In a
case of derogation, the international machinery of supervision of the
European Convention also covers this aspect. The European Court of
Human Rights has, in fact, examined the consistency of some measures
of derogation with other obligations under international law, but in
each instance has been satisfied that there was no violation. 87
In connection with the right to life, article 15 contains a special refer-
ence to other obligations under international law. The right to life con-
tained in article 2 is not subject to derogation "except in respect of
deaths resulting from lawful acts of war". 88 The precise meaning of
this reference to "lawful acts of war" is not entirely clear. One possible
interpretation would prohibit killings in contravention of the laws and
customs of warfare, including international humanitarian law. Such a
narrow interpretation, however, would focus exclusively on the meth-
ods of warefare and would disregard the legality of war as such. A
broader reading of this provision must include the question of whether
there was a violation of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in
article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Obviously this latter interpretation has
to be preferred. It would make little sense to exclude the most inhu-
mane and obnoxious of all international crimes-waging an aggressive
war-from the ambit of the European Human Rights Convention.
This means that the international organs supervising the Convention
may very well one day find themselves in the position of having to
decide whether one of the members has waged an aggressive or other-
wise illegal war. The only situation under which a member could in-
voke the "lawful act of war" exception would be a war of self-defense
86. Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,
75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
87. Lawless Case (Lawless v. Ireland), 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 438,
480-82 (Eur. Court of Human Rights); Ireland v. U.K., [1978] 2 E.H.R.R. 25, 97 (Eur. Court
of Human Rights).
88. European Convention, supra note 7, art. 2.
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within the meaning of article 51 of the U.N. Charter or another inter-
nationally accepted exception to the prohibition of aggression. Even in
this situation, a member would have to adhere scrupulously to the rules
of warfare, especially as developed in international humanitarian law,
in order to remain within the limits of article 15 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. It is significant that both the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention
on Human Rights do not contain a "lawful acts of war" exception to
the right to life. Both conventions refuse to even contemplate the possi-
bility of a "legal" war in the context of the protection of human rights.
III. Conclusion
The foregoing review of past practice reveals a high degree of con-
formity with the policy preferences formulated above. The European
Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights have each examined a wide range of contextual factors in bal-
ancing community interests against individual interests. This brief sur-
vey summarized this practice at a relatively high level of abstraction,
but an examination of the relevant reports and judgments in extenso
will reveal the care and detail with which a large number of social and
political aspects have been taken into consideration. The principles of
necessity and proportionality have been applied rigorously.
Nevertheless, there is room for improvement, especially with respect
to the procedural aspects of supervision. At present, the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe simply registers notices of derogation
without an examination on the merits. An investigation into whether a
state has transgressed its "margin of appreciation" only takes place if a
complaint is filed with the Commission subject to a possible subsequent
examination by the Court.89 Such an investigation therefore depends,
inter alia, on whether the state in question has submitted to individual
petition or to the jurisdiction of the Court and on whether there is a
party entitled and willing to file a complaint. The time lost before a
case was filed against Turkey demonstrates that this does not always
lead to satisfactory results.
It would therefore be advisable to introduce an automatic permanent
supervision of derogations. The existing right of the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe to request explanations under article 57 of the
European Convention on Human Rights concerning its implementa-
89. For a generally skeptical view of the Commission's role in emergency situations, see
O'Boyle, supra note 3.
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tion might serve as a starting point, but it is not sufficient. The actual
supervision would have to be exercised either by the Commission or by
the Committee of Ministers. Under this system, states availing them-
selves of the derogation clause would be required to supply the
following:
1. Proof of an emergency requiring a derogation.
2. Information concerning the exact measures taken. A general
declaration of a state of siege or of martial law would not be sufficient.
This information should not only be accompanied by the relevant legis-
lative texts but also by a detailed account of the measures actually
taken.
3. Precise time limits for all measures.
4. Biannual reports concerning the continued necessity of the dero-
gation, detailing any relaxations or expansions of the emergency
measures.
Finally, it is worth examining whether the list of rights that are not
subject to derogation should be expanded. The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention each have
a more extensive list of such rights. An expansion may even go beyond
the lists contained in these two conventions. For instance, it is inexplic-
able why the right to marry90 should ever be subjected to derogation.
Perhaps the best solution is to promulgate an exhaustive list of rights
subject to derogation and thereby transform the prohibition on deroga-
tion into the rule rather than the exception to article 15.
90. European Convention, supra note 7, art. 12.
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